Optimal and Nonoptimal Satisficing II: An Experimental Analysis by Grether, David M. & Wilde, Louis L.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA. CALIFORNIA 91125 
OPTIMAL_ ANJ)_ NONOPTIMAL SATISFIClNG _II: 
David M. Grether and Louis L. Wilde 
AN· EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS __ ___ _ 
I 
�c,1\lUTE OF '"" ,.� 
�.,. 
� 
� 
1> � i'.'.'.'. ..... 0 
:5 � 
;.. � 
� 
� ,,.._ cc.: 
"'"1: .... � 
"1 Slf�LL tAli-�\. 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 425 
April 1982 
Revised August 1982 
OPTIMAL AND NONOPl'IMAL SATISFICING II: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper the authors report the results of a series of 
individual choice experiments designed to test the usefulness of a 
particular theory of satisficing and of conjunctive choice models. 
Several authors have argued that modeling complicated choice problems 
by using a conjunctive approach can provide useful simplifications. 
In fact optimal behavior with these models can involve implementation 
of extremely complicated strategies. The experiments reported deal 
with multidimensional search problems structured so that the 
conjunctive model is appropriate. Four groups of subjects performed 
the same tasks with similar results. In general, subjects' behavior 
conforms well to predictions based on optimization and where there is 
systematic deviation they are consistent with a specific theory of 
satisficing. 
OPTIMAL AND NONOPTIMAL SAl'ISFICING II: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS*
David M. Grether and Louis L. Wilde 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent working paper, Wilde (1981) presented a new 
approach to the theory of satisficing, the initial observation being 
that the existing economics literature on satisficing seldom generates 
testable hypotheses because the models typically fail to include the 
relevant information acquisition and processing costs (see, e.g., 
Futia 1977; Radner 1975 a, 1975b; Radner and Rothschild 1975; and 
Winter 1971) . By including information acquisition costs, though, it 
is possible to characterize "optimal" satisficing strategies using the 
(constrained) optimization techniques familiar to all economists. 
Moreover, the equations which characterize the optimal satisficing 
strategy will then be given by a set of first-order conditions. As in 
most economic problems, these first-order conditions will have a 
marginal benefit-marginal cost interpretation. 
So far, this all seems straightforward. The problem is that 
the optimal satisficing strategy can still be very complicated, and 
the whole point of satisficing rules is that they are presumed to be 
"easier" to use (operationalize) than optimizing rules. The question 
is whether there is any systematic way of simplifying the optimal 
satisficing strategy to make it less computationally complex. 
*The support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully
acknowledged. 
This is where the marginal benefit-marginal cost 
interpretation of the first-order conditions becomes useful. It is 
generally possible to preserve the logic of the marginal benefit-
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marginal cost interpretation but simplify the calculations involved in 
solving the first-order conditions by ignoring certain kinds of 
information or interactions, yielding various "nonoptimal" satisficing 
strategies. 
This approach to satisficing has several advantages over the 
existing literature. First, many nonoptimal satisficing strategies 
would not be evident in the absence of the formal model. Second, both 
the optimal satisficing strategy and the nonoptimal satisf icing 
strategies based on it are amenable to comparative statics analysis. 
Thus we can test which strategy decisionmakers actually use. This 
highlights the third advantage; the approach makes it unnecessary to 
make any a priori judgments about which strategies are "easy" and 
which are "difficult" from a computational point of view, a problem 
which plagued some of the early literature on satisficing (e.g. , 
Simon, 1955 , 1972) . 
Wilde (1981) developed and illustrated this approach to 
satisficing in the context of a specific example. The purpose of this 
paper is to report the results of a series of laboratory experiments 
designed to test the theory in the context of the same example. 
Section II will summarize the model and illustrate the comparative 
statics properties of the optimal satisficing strategy and the various 
nonoptimal satisficing strategies based on it. Section III will 
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Consider first equation (1) . Here all attributes have been inspected 
except the last, so that the first n - 1 attributes must all exceed 
their cutoff levels. If this were an optimizing rule, Yi would ben 
set to take account of the actual observed values of x1 through xn-l"
But Yi has to be set ex ante. Hence it is set so that the ex anten 
i 
expected gain from accepting the item, measured by V n, just equals W,
the value of searching again. 
For the second to the last attribute, the marginal expected 
i 
gain from inspecting one more attribute, in this case V n-l - W, is
weighted by the likelihood the item will be acceptable, 1 - pi , andn 
compared to the marginal expected cost of observing the last 
attribute, in this case ci • In general (3) reflects similarn 
benefit-cost calculations for the remaining attributes i1, ••• ,in_2 • 
The ordering problem is somewhat easier to characterize. Let 
R(i) = ci/pi. Then the optimal ordering is to inspect attributes with
the smallest values of R(i) first. This rule verifies the intuition 
that an attribute should be inspected early if it has low inspection 
costs or a high probability of failure--there is no point in incurring 
inspection costs on a number of attributes which are likely to be 
acceptable only to reject the item late in the game on the basis of an 
attribute which is cheap to inspect or unlikely to be acceptable. 
Wilde (1981) also derives comparative statics for the optimal 
conjunctive strategy. Table 1 presents these for n = 3 when 
i1 = 1, i2 = 2, and i3 = 3. The minus signs in parenthesis mean the
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TABLE 1: Comparative Statics for the Optimal Conjunctive Strategy 
c. 
1 
* 
I I c1 I c2 I c I 1-. I 1---1--3-1 
I Y1 I (-) I + I + I1-. I 1----1----1 
I Y2 I (-) I - I + I 1
-. I 1-- 1---1 
I y3 I <-> I <-> I - I 
sampling cost on attribute i. 
y. = optimal cutoff level on attribute i 
1 for a risk-neutral decisionmaker. 
TABLE 2: Comparative Statics When Sequentiality Is Ignored 
I I c1 I c2 I c I 1-. -1-- 1---1--3 I 
I Y1 I - I + I + I 1--.-1--1--1- -1 
I Y2 I + I - I + I l--;--1---1---1--1 I Y3 I + I + I - I ------- ----- ---
TABLE 3: Comparative Statics When Sequentiality and 
Simultaneity Axe Ignored 
I I c 1 I c2 I c I1 -.---1--1--1-
3-1 
I Y1 I - I 0 I 0 I 1--.---1--1----1--1 
I y2 I o I - I o I 1--.-1--1---1--1 
I y3 I o I o I - I
-------- ------------
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TABLE 4: Comparative Statics When Dynamic Effects Are Ignored 
I I cl I c2 I c I1 -.--1----1---1-�--I
I Y1 I o I C+> I C+> I1-.--1---1--1--1 
I Y2 I o I <-> I C+> I 1-. -1---1--1----1 
I y3 I o I o I H I ------------
TABLE 5 :  Comparative Statics When Dynamic Effects and 
Simultaneity Axe Ignored 
c. 
1 
* 
I I c1 I c2 I c I 1--.--1---1--1-L-1 
I Y1 I o I + I + I 1-. -1--1---1--1 
I Y2 I o I o I + I 1 -.--1--1--1----1 
I y3 I o I o I o I - --- --- --
sampling cost on attribute i; 
y. = optimal cutoff level on attribute i 
1 for a risk-neutral decisionmaker. 
then eliciting their cutoff levels. This section will describe the 
particulars of this process. 
Subjects were recruited from social science and business 
classes. They were told that this was an economics experiment, that 
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they would be paid cash at the end of the experiment (which should 
last about an hour) , and that the minimum payment would be $5. Higher 
payments were possible, but could not be guaranteed. Volunteers were 
given slips of paper stating the time and room number of the 
experiment. No other information was supplied to the subjects. 
During the course of the experiment random numbers were 
generated using a bingo cage containing balls numbered 0,1, 
• • •  ,9. The 
numbers 1 to 100 were generated by two draws with replacement; the 
first draw being the units digit and the second being the tens. 
Double zero counted as 100 . One subject was chosen by lot, or 
election if the number of volunteers was small enough, to serve as a 
monitor who inspected the bingo cage and made and recorded the results 
of the draws from the bingo cage. 
Subjects were given three types of problems, three one-
attribute, six two-attribute and eight three-attribute, in that order, 
for a total of seventeen problems. In each case the payoff function 
was linear in the attributes with unitary coefficients; i.e., 
U(x1) = xl' U(x1,x2) = xl + x2' and U(x1,x2,x3) = xl + x2 + X3•
respectively, for the three types of problems. Subjects were informed 
at the outset of the experiment that they would be rewarded on the 
basis of their choices for one of the seventeen problems, to be 
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TABLE 6: Parameter Values for the Two-Attribute Problems and Optimal 
Cutoffs for Wealth-Maximizing Strategies 
Type 2A: L:x1 = [1,111. L:x2 = [1,11]
I # I c1 I c2 11 y� I y; 1-1 I I I  I--
I 1 I .2s I .2s 11 1 .6s I 6 .s 3 
1--1 I 11 1 --
1 2 I 2 .oo I .2s 11 3 .84 3.20 
1--1 I I I  1 --
I 3 I .2s I 2.00 11 8.46 3.28 
Type 2B: L:x1 = [3,81 . L:x2 = [4,121 
• • I I # I c1 I c2 11 y1 I Y21-1 I 11---1--1 
I 1 I .10 I .10 I I  6 .20 I 9 .s4 I
1-1 I 11 I I 
I 2 I i.so I .10 11 3.17 I 6.86 I
1
-
1 I I I  I I 
I 3 I .10 I 2.so 11 6.92 I s.11 I
ci = sampling cost on attribute i. 
y� = optimal cutoff level on attribute i 
1 for a risk-neutral decisionmaker. 
TABLE 7: Parameter Values for the Three Attribute Problems and 
Optimal Cutoffs for Wealth-�laximizing Strategies 
Type 3A: 
L:Xi 
= [0,8], L:x2 = [0,81, L:� = [0,81
I # I c1 I c2 I c3 11 y; I y; I y; Il--l--1--1--11--1-- l -- I 
I 1 I .10 I .10 I .10 11 s.32 I 4.42 I 4.02 I
l --1-- l --1--11--1-- l -- I 
I 2 I 2.00 I .10 I .10 11 1.46 I 1.19 I .97 I
l- l --1--1--11--1-- l
-
- I 
I 3 I .10 I 2.00 I .10 11 6.S4 I 1.19 I .96 I
1
--1--1--1--11--1-- l -- I 
I 4 I .10 I .10 I 2.00 11 s.11 I s.1s I .74 I
Type 3B: [Xi= [O,S], [x2 = [0,101. L:x3 = co.101
I # I c1 I c2 I c3 11 y� I Y; I y; I1-1--l--1--11--1-- l -- I  
I 1 I .10 I .10 I .10 11 2.49 I 6.24 I s.11 I
l -1-- l --1--11--1--1--1 
I 2 I . 1s I .10 I .10 11 .1s I 4 .s2 I 4 .18 I
l-1-- l --1--11--1--1--1 
I 3 I .10 I 3 .so I .10 11 3 .92 I .81 I .60 I
1-l--1--1--11--1-- l -- I 
I 4 I .10 I .10 I 3 .so 11 3 .06 I 1 .30 I .18 I
ci = sampling cost on attribute i.
y� = optimal cutoff level on attribute i 1 for a risk-neutral decisionmaker. 
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cl c2 
.10 .10 
2.00 .10 
.10 2.00 
cl c2 
.10 .10 
1.50 .10 
.10 2.50 
TABLE 8 
SUMMARY RESULTS FOR IWO-ATTRIBUTE EQUAL INTERVALS PROBLEMS 
[x1 = u.111 [x2 = c1.111 
Hl'SAC PCC CSUN UCLA 
--
• • - - - - - - -
Y1 Y2 Y1 Y2 Y1 Y2 Y1 Y2 Y1 Y2 
7.65 6.53 6.49 4.90 6 .56 4.67 7 .38 5 .11 7.28 4.62 
3 .84 3 .20 4.82 3 .87 5.01 5 .24 4.46 5 .32 4.88 4 .35 
8.46 3.28 5 .BO 3 .57 7 .31 4.37 7 .57 3.09 7.06 3.54 
SUMMARY RESULTS FOR IWO-ATI'RIBUTE UNEQUAL INTERV ALS PROBLEMS 
[x1 = [3,81 [x2 = [4,121
Hl'SAC PCC CSUN 
--
• • -
Y1 Y2 Y1 Y2 Y1 Y2 Y1 Y2 
6.20 9.54 5 .58 5 .68 5.61 6.72 6.13 7.35 
3.17 6.86 4.97 5. 70 4.60 5.95 4.62 7.00
6.92 5.11 5.75 5.83 5 .51 6.00 6.34 5 .56 
ci = cost per obser vation on attribute i • 
• 
yi = wealth-maximizing cutoff level for attribute i. 
Yi = average actual cutoff level for attribute i. 
UCLA 
Y1 Y2 
6 .24 7.07 
4.85 6.47 
6.13 5.73 
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TABLE 10: Observed Comparative Statics Results 
2A: [Xi = (1,11], [Xi = (1,11] 
Ml'SAC I I PCC I - --1 ---- -------1 
Ac1 I Ac2 I I Ac1 I Ac2 I 1--1 1--1 I 1--1 
Ayl I - I (-) I Ayl I (-) I (+) I -1---1 I I I I 
Ay2 I - I - I Ay2 I (+) I (-) I -------1 -I 
CSUN I UCT..A I --- -1 ----------1
Ac1 I Ac2 I I Ac1 I Ac2 I -I I I I I 
Ayl I - I (+) I Ayl I - I (+) I-I I I 1--1--1 
Ay2 I (+) I - I
-A��--1-�=�-I __ _: __ _!_ 
2B: [Xi= (3,8], [x2 = (4,12]
Ml'SAC I --- 1 
Ac1 I Ac2 I-- 1  I I 
Ayl
Ay:t
I <+> I --1 I 
<+> I <+> I ---------1 
CSUN I------1
I Ac1 I Ac2 I --1---1----1 
Ayl
Ay2 
I - I <+> I1---1--1 
I <-> I - I 
I PCC I 1---- ------1 
I I Ac1 I Ac2 I1---1 1--· -I
I Ayl I - I (-) II I I I 
I Ay2 I <-> I <-> I I - 1 
I ucr..A I 
I -------1 
I I Ac1 I Ac2 I 1--1---1---1 
I Ay1 I - I C+> I I 1--1--1 
I Ay2 I H I - I 
ci = sampling cost on attribute i; -
Yi= average cutoff level on attribute i. 
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TABLE 12: Observed Comparative Statics Results 
3A: [x1 = co,8], [x2 = [0,81 . [x3 = co,81
I l\ITSAC I 
I --- --1 
I I Ac1 I Ac2 I Ac3 I1---1 I I I
I ay1 I - I <+> I C+> I---1 1---1--1 
Ay2 I H I H I <+> I 
--1 I I I 
Ay3 I (+) I (+) I (-) I ------------1 
CSUN I 
I 
I Ac1 I Ac2 I Ac3 I 
--1---1---1---1 
Ayl 
Ay2 
I - I <+> I <+> I
I I 1---1 
I <-> I - I <-> I 
1---1 1--1 
Ay3 I H I <-> I - I
I - PCC I 
1------ ----------1 
I I Ac1 I Ac2 I Ac3 II I 1---1--1 
I a'Y1 I - I H I <+> I 
I 1--1---1 I 
I a-:Y2 I <-> I - I H I I I 1---1 I 
I Ay I H I H I - I 
I 3 - -I 
I UCLA I 
I - I 
I I Ac1 I Ac2 I Ac3 I I 1
-
-1---1 I 
I a'Y1 I - I H I H I I 1---1 I I 
I Ay I H I - I H I 
I 2 I I I I 
I aY,3 I H I <-> I - I 
------ ------ -- -
3B: [x1 = co.sl, [x2 = co,101 . [x3 = co.101
------· 
MT SAC I 
1
-----
----- ------1 
I I Ac1 I Ac2 I Ac3 I 1--1--1--1 I 
I aY.1 I <-> I <+> I <+> II 1---1 1---1 
I Ay2 I (+) I - I (-) II I 1--1--1 
I Ay I H I <-> I - I 
I 3 --------------1 
I CSUN I 
1-- ---------------1 
I I Ac1 I Ac2 I Ac3 II 1---1 I I 
I Ay I - I H I <-> I 
I 1 I 1---1 I 
I aY.2 I <+> I - I H I I I 1--1 I
I ay3 I <+> I H I - I
I PCC I 
I - --
--
-1 
I I Ac1 I Ac2 I Ac3 I ---1 1-- 1--1 
Ay1 I - I H I H I 
_...::,.__ I I I I 
aY.2 I H I - I <+> I 
_...::,.__ I I I I 
Ay3 I <-> I - I - I ----------- -1 
UCLA I 
---·-------------1 
I Ac1 I Ac2 I Ac3 I 
--1---1 I I 
Ay1 I - I <-> I C+> I 1--1 I I I 
I aY.2 I H I - I C+> I I 1--1--1--1 
I aY.3 I H I H I - I 
ci = sampling cost on attribute i;
Yi= average cutoff level on attribute i.
22 
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TABLE 14: Ordering of Individual Cutoff Levels 
(Equal Intervals and Equal Costs) 
Two Attributes 
Probability of at 
(1) (2) (3) Least as Many y1 > y2 Group Y1 > Y2 Y1 = Y2 Y1 < Y2 p = 1/3 p = 1/2 
MrSAC 20 6 7 .0012 .0096 
PCC 15 12 3 .0435 .0038 
CSUN 17 2 3 .0000 .0013 
UCLA 36 5 2
.oooo 
.oooo 
• Total 88 25 15 
*Based on the null hypothesis that p = 1/3, t = 8.5. 
Based on the null hypothesis that p = 1/2, t = 7.2. 
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TABLE 15: Ordering of Individual Cutoff Levels 
(Equal Intervals and Equal Costs) 
Three Attributes 
• •• (3) •• • • (5) ···
Group (1) (2) (4) Y1 ) Y2 ) Y3 Y1 ) Y2 Y1 ) Y3 Y2 ) Y3 Y1 ) Y2 = Y3 
MI'SAC 18 10 9 3 6 
PCC 17 6 s 2 4 
CSUN 7 8 8 2 6 
UCLA 17 11 11 3 6 
Total 59 35 33 10 22 
*Based on the null hypothesis that p = 1/13, t = 16.3. 
••Counts in addition to those shown iu column 1. Based on the null 
hypothesis that p = 1/3, for 
Yl ) Yz• t = 9.6; 
Yl ) y3 , t = 9.2; 
Yz ) y3, t = 4 .9. 
•••Also counted in columns 2 and 3.
TABLE 16: Individual Choices of Problems for Payment (Theoretical Cutoffs) 
2A.2 and 2A.3 3A.2, 3A.3, and 3A.4 
1J Right * 11 Right * Group N p t N p t 
MT SAC 27 16 .221 0.96 30 15 .044 1.94 
CSUN 22 17 .009 2.56 21 16 .ooo 4.17 
UCLA 42 32 .001 3.39 43 31 .000 5.39 
(Wealth-Maximizing Strategy) (High-Cost Last Strategy) 
3B.2, 3B.3, and 3B.4 3B.2, 3B.3, and 3B.4 
Group N I Right * p t N 1J Right p* t 
MT SAC 33 12 .419 0.37 33 10 .565 -0.37 
CSUN 22 8 .293 0.30 22 9 .163 0.75 
UCLA . 43 21 .012 2.16 43 19 .050 1.51 
*
Proba bility of at least as many right, assuming choice of problems is to be 
equally likely. 
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interested in understanding the extent to which people grasp the 
nature of the conjunctive choice rule at a more or less intuitive 
level. During the last decade, there has been a growing belief among 
consumer researchers that the conjunctive rule is often used as an 
initial screening device in complex choice situations (see Bettman 
[1979] for a discussion of this research). If this is true then it is 
clearly important to understand whether people use the rule "properly'' 
and, if they do not, the nature of their difficulties with it. We 
shall discuss the implications of our experiments for consumer 
research elsewhere but an obvious question is whether performance 
might not improve with familiarity. The likely answer to this 
question is yes. The more significant questions are by how much and 
in what ways. If the changes in performance as we move from Ml'SAC to 
PCC to CSUN to UCLA are any indication. it appears reasonable to 
conjecture that improvements due to familiarity are likely to be 
statistically significant but not qualitatively significant� There is 
an obvious set of experiments which could test this conjecture, but we 
have not as yet run them. 
The learning issue also is important in the context of the 
theory of satisficing these experiments are meant to test. A 
traditional, market-oriented economist would reject all theories of 
satisficing as irrelevant since learning behavior, conditioned by the 
discipline of the market. will ultimately make agents act as if they 
are maximizing. This makes more sense in the theory of the firm than 
in the theory of consumer behavior. but even there it misses the 
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point. If agents fail to optimize because of computation costs, then 
learning or familiarity with a problem should not change the 
qualitative behavior of agents unless it reduces those costs. What it 
is likely to do is make agents perform better at whatever nonoptimal 
level they chose to locate. In other words, it should reduce the 
variance in their behavior but not change its qualitative nature. 
This is, in fact, precisely what we saw in these experiments, 
Overall, our results are quite striking. First, the behavior 
of people without prior training corresponds in several ways to 
predictions based on optimizing behavior. Thus, as the cost of 
inspecting a dimension increases. people tend to search less on that 
dimension. For two- and three-attribute goods the rankings across 
attributes of the intensity of search correspond to the prediction of 
optimization. Also, the order in which attributes are inspected is as 
it would be if the order were chosen in order to maximize expected 
return (strictly speaking we infer this latter conclusion from 
responses to a closely related question), 
Additionally. when the observed behavior differed with strict 
optimizing behavior, the differences were uniform across subject pools 
and corresponded roughly to a simple satisf icing strategy. That is, 
subjects in our experiments -responded to changing costs of information 
as if they had simplified the first-order conditions to make them 
easier to handle. Specifically, the behavior suggests that when 
responding to change in information costs the subjects ignored the 
sequential and simultaneous aspects of the solution. 
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TABLE 19: t-Statistics for Comparative Statics 
3A: [x1 = co,81. I>2 = co,81. [x3 = co,81 
MI SAC I 
----
-
1 
I Ac1 I Ac2 I Ac3 I 
--
-
1 I I I 
-
I l.s1 I .10 I .1s I 
I- I 1--1 
Ay2 I .36 I 1.07 I .66 I
_ 
I -I I I 
Ayl
Ay3 I . 72 I .3S I .03 I - I 
-
Ayl
-
Ay2 
Ac1 
3.71 
CSUN I 
-------1 
Ac2 I Ac3 I-�-I I 
.06 I .2s I 
--
- 1 I I 
.9S 3.71 I .s6 I 
--
- 1 I I 
Ay3 I .SS I .88 I 2.39 I
-------------
I PCC I 
I I 
I I Ac1 I Ac2 I Ac3 I 1
---1 I I I 
I ay1 I 2 .92 I .01 I .01 I I 
_ I I I I 
I ay2 I .91 I 1. 10 I ,14 I 1
---1 I I I 
I Ay3 I 1.00 I ,94 I 1.83 I I I 
I UCLA I 
I - --- ---1 
I I Ac1 I Ac2 I Ac3 I 1---1 I 1---1 
I Ay1 I 6.06 I .3s I .32 I 1---1--1 1---1 
I Ay2 I .9S I 3 .82 I .OS I I I 1--1 I 
_
I 
_
aY.3 � 1.11 I l.3s I 4.s8 I
3B: [x1 = co,sL [x2 = co,10], [x3 = co,101 
I Ml'SAC I 
I ----1 
I I Ac1 I Ac2 I Ac3 I 1---1 I -1--1 
I ay1 I .44 I .01 I .11 I I I I I I 
I ay2 I .40 I 1.46 I .48 I1---1 I I I 
I ay3 I i.1s I .8s I 1.69 I I I 
I CSUN I 
I -----1 
I I Ac1 I Ac2 I Ac3 I1
---1 I 1--1 
I aY:1 I 2.1s I .11 I i.09 II I I I I 
I Ay2 I .06 I 3 .so I .20 II I I I I 
I Ay3 I .48 I 1.00 I 2.10 I 
-
I PCC I 
I --- -1 
I I Ac1 I Ac2 I Ac3 I 1
---1 1---1--1 
I ay1 I 1.43 I .60 I .21 I I I 1----1--1 
I aY.2 I .16 I i.s1 I .10 I 1---1 I 1--1 
I ay3 I .79 I 1.37 I 1.87 I I ----1 
I UCLA I 
I I 
I I Ac1 I Ac2 I Ac3 I 1--1 I I I 
I Ayl I 2 .lS I .09 I .03 I I I I 1--1 
I ay2 I 1.16 I 4.43 I .04 I 1--1 1--1 -I 
_
I 
_
aY.3_
1 _
_
_ .41_���=--
�
--��
11 
__ � 
ci = sampling cost on attribute i; yi = average cutoff level on attribute i 
TABLE 20: t-Statistics for Decreasing Cutoff Levels 
2A: [ x1 = c1,11L [ x2 = c1,111
Group Y1 vs y2 
MI'SAC 2.63 
PCC 2.70 
CSUN 3 .81 
UCLA s.20
3A: [x1 '= co,8L [x2 = (0,8L [x3 = [0,81 
Group 
c1 = .10, c2 = .10, c3 = .10 
-
- -
Yl vs y2 y2 vs y3 
:rlll'SAC 1.8S 1.09 
PCC 2.26 .21 
CSUN 1.77 1.37 
UCLA 3.26 .46 
ci = sampling cost on attribute i 
yi = average cutoff level on attribute i 
3S 
39 38 
TABLE 23. Complete Summary Results for Three-Attribute Equal Intervals TABLE 24. Complete summary Results for Three-Attribute Unequal Intervals Problems: Means and Variance of Observed Cutoff Levels Problems: Means and Variances of Observed Cutoff Levels 
3.A: [x1 = co.sL [x2 = co.sL [x3 = co.s1 3.B: [x1 = co.sL [x2 = co.10], [x3 = co.101
2 2 2 
- 2 2 2 # N cl c2 C3 Y1 Y2 Y3 al a2 a3 # N cl c2 C3 Y1 Y2 Y3 al a2 a3 
MfSAC MI'SAC 
1 33 .10 .10 .10 3.88 2.93 2.44 4.99 3.47 3.01 1 33 .10 .10 .10 2.ss 3 .so 3.73 1.81 4.6S 7 .87 2 33 2.00 .10 . •  10 3.06 2.77 2. 79 4.43 2.74 4.37 2 32 • 7S .10 .10 2.40 3.74 2.96 l.6S 6.13 6.32 3 33 .10 2.00 .10 2.93 2.4S 2 .60 4.S4 2.ss 3 .Sl 3 33 .10 3 .so .10 2.S8 2.71 3.16 2.01 4.61 6.60 4 33 .10 .10 2.00 3.96 3.24 2.43 4.27 3.71 3.90 4 32 .10 .10 3 .so 2.s2 3.2S 2.63 1.S3 4.16 S.S9 
PCC PCC 
1 30 .10 .10 .10 4.69 3 .39 3.27 4.91 4.68 4.77 1 30 .10 .10 .10 2.76 4.11 4.lS 1.82 8 .S3 9.32 2 30 2.00 .10 .10 2.99 2.88 2.72 4.88 4.26 4.0S 2 30 
• 1S .10 .10 2.24 3.99 3.S6 l.9S 7.22 7.06 3 30 .10 2.00 .10 4.68 2.49 2.73 6.26 3.38 4.69 3 30 .10 3 .so .10 2.S4 2.99 3.13 2.11 7 .S3 6 .so 4 30 .10 .10 2.00 4.69 3 .31 2.2S s .3S 4.77 4.18 4 30 .10 .10 3 .so 2.69 4.18 2.1s 2.12 7.93 6.9S 
CSUN CSUN 
1 22 .10 .10 .10 S.08 4.00 3.16 4.19 3.66 4.22 1 22 .10 .10 .10 3 .11 4.90 3.78 2.22 7 .69 7.79 2 22 2.00 .10 .10 2.8S 3.43 2.83 3.38 4.06 3.19 2 21 .7S .10 .10 2.17 4.94 4.17 1.68 3 .39 s .90 3 22 .10 2.00 .10 s.12 2 ,03 2.61 4.90 2.29 3.99 3 22 .10 3 .so .10 3.06 2.29 2.97 2.04 3.98 s .82 4 22 .10 .10 2.00 s.2s 3.66 1.79 6.0S 4.23 2.70 4 22 .10 .10 3 .so 2.60 4.73 2.16 2.S4 7.18 4.67 
UCLA UCLA 
1 43 .10 .10 .10 s .36 3.9S 3.7S 4.14 3 .72 4.39 1 43 .10 .10 .10 3.06 S.23 4.38 1.66 S.93 6.0S 2 43 2.00 .10 .10 2.86 3 .S6 3.22 2.99 3 .S2 4.33 2 43 .7S .10 .10 2.46 4.61 4.16 1.67 S.73 S.49 3 43 .10 2.00 .10 s.21 2.42 3.17 3.47 3.04 3.44 3 43 .10 3 .so .10 3.04 3.00 3.79 1.22 4.70 6.9S 4 43 .10 .10 2.00 s.22 3.93 1.90 3.70 3.40 2.49 4 43 .10 .10 3.SO 3.0S s.20 2.40 1.38 S.16 3.37 
ci = sampling cost on attribute i 
c. = sampling cost on at
0
tribute i y. = average cutoff level on attribute i 1 
1 y. = average cutoff level on attribute i 
a� = sample variance 1 1 
a� = sample variance 1 
Group 
Ml'SAC 
PCC 
CSUN 
UCLA 
MI'SAC 
PCC 
CSUN 
UCLA 
Ml'SAC 
PCC 
CSUN 
UCLA 
TABLE 26: Counts Indicating Direction of Change in Cutoff Levels 
3A 3B 
Ayl Ay2 Ay3 Ayl Ay2 
__!!_
3 
+ 0 - + 0 - + 0 - + 0 - + 0 - + 0 
Ac1 ) 0 Ac1 ) 0
8 7 18 10 12 11 10 13 10 8 11 13 14 10 8 7 11 
5 7 18 7 11 12 6 10 14 6 11 13 9 14 7 4 15 
1 3 18 6 6 10 7 5 10 1 3 17 6 7 8 8 6 
1 6 36 12 11 20 5 14 24 7 13 23 10 11 22 11 10 
Ac2 ) 0 Ac2 ) 0 
13 11 8 6 9 17 8 14 11 11 10 11 9 6 17 10 11 
9 11 10 6 11 13 8 11 11 6 15 9 7 8 15 7 9 
5 9 8 4 0 18 6 5 11 6 8 8 0 4 18 3 7 
7 13 23 6 6 31 10 7 26 10 21 12 7 6 30 9 12 
Ac3 > 0 Ac3 ) 0 
11 9 11 16 11 6 8 11 14 9 12 11 10 11 11 7 8 
4 15 9 10 12 8 5 11 14 8 15 7 8 15 7 6 9 
6 9 7 6 5 11 2 4 16 3 8 11 9 7 6 3 5 
8 19 16 15 12 16 3 10 30 9 24 10 15 15 13 4 7 
ci = sampling cost on attribute i
Yi = cutoff level on attribute i 
41 
14 
11 
7 
22 
11 
14 
12 
22 
17 
15 
14 
32 
44 
seven items generated were below your cutoff level, but that the next 
one was above the cutoff. Your payment would be the amount of the 
last item generated (the eighth) minus eight times the cost of 
generating an item. 
First, we shall ask you to select one individual as a monitor 
to watch the procedures, to examine the equipment, and to make sure 
that the the experimenters really are doing what they say they are 
doing. The monitor should check the truthfulness of what the 
experimenter says, but other than that may not communicate any 
information to you in any way. If the monitor communicates any other 
information, he or she will be asked to leave without payment. The 
monitor will receive *���· 
(pick volunteer) 
INSTIWCTIONS 
PART TWO 
45 
The two-attribute problem is similar to the single-attribute 
problem. Tirotrattribute items are described by two numbers, a level of 
attribute 1 and a level cf attribute 2 .  The rule for selecting a two­
attribute item works much like that for selecting a single-attribute 
item, You must choose a cutoff level for attribute 1 and a cutoff 
level for attribute 2 .  As before, these will determine the smallest 
levels that you can receive for each attribute. 
Once you have set cutoff levels for each attribute, we will 
begin searching for an item by generating levels for attribute 1 
(again using the bingo cage). As before, we will generate items until 
one is found which has a level of attribute 1 in excess of your cutoff 
level for attribute 1. Each time an item is rejected and a new one is 
generated, you will be charged a fixed amount. Once an accepted level 
for attribute 1 has been found, we will generate a single level for 
attribute 2 .  You will also be charged a fixed amount for this, 
although it may differ from the cost for generating levels of 
attribute 1. If the level of attribute 2 is less than your cutoff 
level for attribute 2, the entire item will be rejected and a new item 
generated starting with attribute 1. In other words, if the level of 
attribute 2 is below your cutoff level, you must begin your search for 
an item with attribute l�in the tw�-attribute problem, each attribute 
must exceed its cutoff level in order that the item be acceptable. 
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your cutoff level, you must begin your search for an i tem with 
attribute l�in the three-attribute problem each attribute must exceed 
its cutoff level in order that the item be accepted. Otherwise, you 
start over. However, the costs for generating levels of each 
attribute will still be charged to you. Thus, your payoff in the 
three-attribute problem is the sum of the final values generated for 
each attribute, less the costs of generating all the numbers needed to 
find an accepted i tem. 
Example: 
1. Three draws requi red to get an accepted level of attribute 1. 
2. First draw on attribute 2 below its cutoff level. 
3. Five draws requi red to get another accepted level for attribute 1. 
4. One draw for attribute 2, again below cutoff level. 
S. Two draws needed to get new attribute 1.
6. One draw for attribute 2�above cutoff level�accepted. 
7. One draw for attribute 3�rejected. 
8. Four draws to get an accepted level of attribute 1. 
9. One draw for attribute 2�accepted. 
10. One draw for attribute 3�accepted. 
Your payoff would be the last value generated at step 8 plus 
the value generated at step 9 plus the value at step 10 minus fourteen 
times the cost of generating a first attribute (cost 1) minus four 
times the cost of generating a second attribute (cost 2) and minus two 
times the cost of generating a third attribute (cost 3). 
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SAMPLE FORMS USED BY SUBJECTS 
ONE ATTRIBUTE 
Name'--������������������-
Social Security No •. ������������� 
Subject Number ������������� 
Decision No·���� 
Minimum Maximum 
Possible Possible Cutoff Number of Final Value: V 
Attribute Value Value Cost: C Level C!ra-ws: N 
1 
Att. v _ c x N � 1earnings1 
n--o-- -­LJ__ __I I __ 
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